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How Work Affects Divorce
The Mediating Role of Financial and Time Pressures
ANNE-RIGT POORTMAN
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
This study examines whether the financial and time pressures associated with spouses’work-
ing lives play a role in the relation between work and divorce during the first years of mar-
riage. Using retrospective data from the Netherlands, the results show that divorce is more
likely when the husband works on average fewer hours and the wife more hours during the
first years of marriage. Furthermore, couples facing more financial problems and those
spending less time together have a higher divorce risk. The findings partly support the hy-
pothesis that greater financial strains are responsible for the higher divorce risk when hus-
bands work fewer hours. About 15% of the higher divorce risk of husbands working fewer
hours is explained by the resulting greater financial strains. No support is found for the hy-
pothesis that the higher divorce risk of women who work more hours is due to a decrease in
marital interaction time.
Keywords: divorce; marital interaction time; financial problems; work
An extensive body of research suggests that the way couples organize
their working lives may affect the stability of their relationship. Although
findings are not always consistent, studies indicate that couples in which
the wife works or works more hours have a higher probability of divorce,
whereas employment or employment stability of the husband reduces the
risk of divorce (e.g., Bracher, Santow, Morgan, & Trussell, 1993;
Bumpass, Martin, & Sweet, 1991; Cherlin, 1979; Hiedemann,
Suhomlinova, & O’Rand, 1998; South & Spitze, 1986). It is yet not
clearly understood, however, why work affects divorce (Greenstein,
1990; Spitze & South, 1985). In the current study, I focused on two inter-
pretations that have received relatively little attention in recent divorce lit-
erature: the financial and time pressures associated with work.
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The destabilizing influence of the wife’s work might be the result of a
decrease in the amount of time together (Booth, Johnson, White, & Ed-
wards, 1984; Spitze & South, 1985). Time has become increasingly
scarce because of the rise in women’s labor force participation. More and
more couples have to combine tasks and balance their working schedules
to be able to spend time together. Because wives, even when they work,
still do most household tasks (Spitze 1986; Van der Lippe, 1997), their
time spent in the labor market might be at the expense of spouses’ shared
time. In light of the importance of marital interaction time for marital sta-
bility (Booth et al., 1984; Hill, 1988; Jiping, 1992; Kingston & Nock,
1987), wives’ employment may increase the risk of divorce.
The higher divorce risk if the husband is unemployed or has an unsta-
ble career might be due to the resulting financial hardship (Cherlin, 1979;
Voydanoff, 1983, 1990). Western societies faced economic stagnation
and mass unemployment in the last quarter of the 20th century, and unem-
ployment of the main breadwinner may have resulted in considerable fi-
nancial strains. Because such strains might negatively affect the marital
relationship (Conger et al., 1990; Fox & Chancey, 1998), husbands’ un-
employment could increase the risk of divorce.
Although husbands’ unemployment, in particular, will have financial
ramifications given the continuing greater work efforts of men and their
higher wages (Sørensen & McLanahan, 1987; Van Berkel & de Graaf,
1998), women’s work may have financial implications as well. Wives’
employment provides families with an additional income and might re-
duce financial problems, which in turn enhances marital stability
(Greenstein, 1990; Heckert, Nowak, & Snyder, 1998). Similarly, hus-
bands’ work may have time implications. Considering the wife’s greater
contribution to domestic tasks, time pressures resulting from the hus-
band’s work will probably only be felt when he works excessive or irregu-
lar hours (Piotrkowski, Rapoport, & Rapoport, 1987; Presser, 2000).
The extent to which financial and time pressures play a role as
destabilizing factors in the linkage between spouses’work and divorce has
rarely been examined. Some of the few existing studies have addressed the
issue indirectly and offer suggestive evidence (Heckert et al., 1998; Ono,
1998; Spitze & South, 1985). These studies did not have direct measures
of marital interaction time and financial stress and used indirect method-
ological strategies to examine the role of financial and time pressures. For
example, Spitze and South (1985) studied the role of time pressures by ex-
amining the effect of wives’ work for different subgroups, which are as-
sumed to differ with respect to time pressures, such as couples with and
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without children. Other studies have addressed the role of financial or
time pressures more directly by using direct measures and assessing indi-
rect effects. However, they focus on the quality or instability of the marital
relation instead of actual divorce as the outcome of interest (Booth et al.,
1984; Broman, Hamilton, & Hoffman, 1990).
Using data from a retrospective survey in the Netherlands, I examined
the role of financial and time pressures associated with the working lives
of husband and wife in a direct way and focused on actual divorce as the
outcome. I have information about the number of financial problems dur-
ing the first years of marriage, such as whether the newlywed couple was
able to make ends meet. The survey also contains information on how of-
ten spouses participated jointly in leisure activities during the first years of
the marriage. There is also information on the labor market career of both
spouses. This makes it possible to examine the role of financial stress and
marital interaction time for the linkage between spouses’ work lives and
divorce.
The focus is on the first years of marriage. From a substantive view-
point, the first years of marriage are critical ones. During this period,
spouses have to find a balance between their private and working lives.
Not only are their labor market careers subject to insecurity and change
but also are their private lives, as is the case when children arrive. Work-
related time pressures could therefore be particularly important during
this period. Similarly, during the first years of marriage spouses are con-
fronted with considerable expenses associated with setting up a new
household. Because they are also at the start of their labor market career,
their economic resources may not always be sufficient to cover these ex-
penses. Financial strains may thus be felt particularly hard during this
period.
By using the Netherlands as a test case, a rather conservative test is ob-
tained for the role of financial stress and marital interaction time. First, the
Netherlands is characterized by a relatively extensive welfare system.
When it comes to income continuity in case of unemployment, the Neth-
erlands has one of the highest net replacement rates and also does rela-
tively well in combating poverty (Social and Cultural Planning Office of
the Netherlands, 2000). The extent to which the breadwinner’s unemploy-
ment leads to financial stress might thus not be that large. Second, al-
though the Dutch nowadays generally approve of female employment
(Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands, 1998), they also
emphasize that women’s employment is a matter of choice. These atti-
tudes toward working women are combined with a relatively strong focus
on family life, in that most Dutch people agree that the family comes first,
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particularly when there are children (Hooghiemstra & Keuzenkamp,
2000, p. 130). The focus of Dutch women on part-time work suggests that
they behave accordingly and adjust their working hours to their family re-
sponsibilities instead of the other way around (Tijdens, 1997). The
decrease in marital interaction time because of women’s employment
might thus not be that large.
The role of financial and time pressures is examined in four steps. First,
I asked whether husbands’ and wives’ work affect the probability of di-
vorce. I not only examined the impact of spouses’work in general but also
studied the role of specific time aspects and financial aspects of work.
Second, I addressed the extent to which husbands’ and wives’ work lives
are associated with marital interaction time and financial stress; if
spouses’work efforts do not result in lower marital interaction time or less
financial stress, the extent to which financial and time pressures play a role
as destabilizing factors in the link between work and divorce will probably
be not that large. Third, I asked whether marital interaction time and finan-
cial stress have an influence on the risk of divorce; if they do not affect the
risk of divorce, their role as destabilizing factors will also be relatively
small. Finally, I addressed the question of whether the work effects are
mediated by financial strain and the amount of marital interaction time.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Figure 1 illustrates the role of financial stress and marital interaction
time for the relation between work and divorce. In general, the husband’s
greater work efforts are expected to decrease the risk of divorce (Path A).
There are several interpretations for this linkage between the husband’s
work and divorce.
It has been argued that husbands who are less successful in the labor
market do not live up to the expectation of being the breadwinner. Failure
to live up to such traditional role expectations might lead to dissatisfac-
tion, which in turn increases the risk of divorce (Cherlin, 1979; McKee &
Bell, 1986). Another interpretation is that male unemployment or em-
ployment instability negatively affects the psychological well-being of
husbands and wives (Voydanoff, 1990; Warr, Jackson, & Banks, 1988).
These negative psychological effects could, in turn, lead to increased mar-
ital instability (Atkinson, Liem, & Liem, 1986; Liem & Liem, 1988). The
link between husbands’ work and divorce has also been explained by fi-
nancial aspects. Husbands’ unemployment or employment instability
might lead to financial strains. Financial stress may, in turn, negatively af-
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fect marital stability because economic strains could lead to more con-
flicts and less affective interaction between spouses (Conger et al., 1990;
Liker & Elder, 1983).
These interpretations suggest that at least part of the stabilizing influ-
ence of the husband’s labor market success might be due to fewer financial
strains (Path B). Financial stress is a relative and diverse concept
(Voydanoff, 1990); however, as a potentially destabilizing factor for fam-
ily life it has been found to be best referred to as people’s own evaluation
of their financial situation, for example in terms of insufficient financial
means (Fox & Chancey, 1998; Voydanoff, 1990).
Evidence on the mediating role of financial stress is often indirect and
focuses on subjective indicators for marital stability instead of actual di-
vorce. These findings show that a husband’s poor labor market position
leads to greater financial stress (Conger et al., 1990), and that financial
strains lead to less marital satisfaction and a greater propensity toward di-
vorce (Fox & Chancey, 1998). A study that directly assessed the mediat-
ing role of financial stress by estimating indirect effects shows that the
negative impact of the husband’s unemployment on marital quality is me-
diated to a relatively large extent by financial stress (Broman et al., 1990).
172 JOURNAL OF FAMILY ISSUES / March 2005
 A 
—
F            B    __
 +
—
—
  —
—  
E            D
 
+
C
Husband’s 
work
Wife’s 
work
Financial 
stress
Interaction 
time
Divorce 
risk
Figure 1: Spouses’Work and Divorce: The Role of Financial Stress and Marital Inter-
action Time as Mediating Factors
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For the wife’s work, greater work efforts are expected to increase the
risk of divorce (Path C). The most common microeconomic interpretation
is that the wife’s work undermines the traditional division of labor and
thereby reduces the efficiency gains resulting from specialization, which
in turn increases the risk of divorce (Becker, 1981). A second economic
argument is that women who work are financially independent, which
makes it easier to leave a marriage (Cherlin, 1979; Ono, 1998). The higher
divorce risk of women who work has also been interpreted in light of tradi-
tional role expectations. Women’s work opposes traditional norms and
might therefore lead to dissatisfaction or competition, in turn, increasing
the risk of divorce (Orbuch & Custer, 1995; Vannoy & Philliber, 1992).
The destabilizing influence of the wife’s employment has also been ex-
plained by the time-consuming aspects of her work (Booth et al., 1984;
Spitze & South, 1985). Because women do most of the housework, time
spent at the job could be at the expense of time spent with the spouse. Be-
cause spouses’shared time might foster companionship or attachment and
is necessary for communication (Hill, 1988; Kingston & Nock, 1987), a
decrease in marital interaction time may, in turn, increase the risk of
divorce.
At least part of the destabilizing influence of the wife’s work might
thus be explained by the resulting decrease in marital interaction time
(Path D). Time with the spouse can be spent in different ways, ranging
from just being together to active participation in joint activities. It has
been found that time actively spent with the spouse is most important for
the marital relationship (Hill, 1988; Kingston & Nock, 1987).
Empirical evidence on the mediating role of marital interaction time is
often indirect. The most indirect evidence comes from studies focusing on
the impact of temporal aspects of the wife’s job. The findings show that
women’s irregular working hours, such as working in shifts, increase the
risk of divorce (Presser, 2000; White & Keith, 1990). Other studies sug-
gest that the role of marital interaction time may not be that large. Studies
on the allegedly inverse relation between the wife’s work and marital in-
teraction time offer inconsistent support. Irregular working hours seem to
be more important than the number of working hours, which are some-
times found to have no effect (Blair, 1993; Kingston & Nock, 1987;
White, 1983). A Dutch study even suggests that the wife’s working hours
increase the time spent in joint activities (Kalmijn & Bernasco, 2001).
Findings on the relation between marital interaction time and marital sta-
bility show that spouses who spend more time together are less likely to
divorce and have a higher marital quality. However, there are also indica-
tions of reversed causality; happy couples are more likely to spend time
Poortman / HOW WORK AFFECTS DIVORCE 173
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on April 9, 2011jfi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
together (Hill, 1988; Jiping, 1992; White, 1983). Finally, a study that di-
rectly tested the mediating role of marital interaction time and focused on
subjective marital stability found only little support (Booth et al., 1984).
As pointed by the dotted arrows in Figure 1, the effect of the wife’s
work may also operate through financial stress (Path E). The wife’s em-
ployment might relieve financial strains, which in turn decreases the risk
of divorce (Greenstein, 1990; Heckert et al., 1998). However, because of
Dutch women’s focus on part-time jobs, husbands continue to be the main
providers. Hence, the extent to which the wife’s work reduces financial
strains is probably not that large, and the destabilizing influence associ-
ated with her work probably outweighs the stabilizing influence due to re-
duced financial stress. Financial stress is therefore not expected to play an
important role in the link between wives’ work and divorce.
Similarly, the husband’s work may affect the divorce risk through mar-
ital interaction time (Path F). His working hours could be at the expense of
spouses’shared time, which in turn increases the risk of divorce. However,
given the wife’s greater contribution to housework, the role of marital in-
teraction is probably limited if husbands work the regular amount of
hours. In case of the husband’s unemployment, marital interaction time is
probably not important either. When the husband does not work at all, the
potential beneficial effects of having more opportunities to spend time to-
gether are perhaps not always realized or offset by the negative effects of
seeing each other too often. Only when the husband works excessive or ir-
regular hours, marital interaction time might become an important
destabilizing influence, as suggested by previous studies (Blair, 1993;
Kalmijn & Bernasco, 2001; Presser, 2000).
METHOD
DATA
To assess the linkages between spouses’work, financial and time pres-
sures, and divorce, prospective data would be ideal. Such data offer the
possibility of analyzing the role of spouses’ work, financial stress, and
marital interaction time over the entire duration of marriage. However,
prospective data that contain enough divorcees and include all the neces-
sary information do not exist in the Netherlands. I therefore used retro-
spective data and focused on the first years of marriage because questions
about financial stress and marital interaction time were only asked for the
first 5 years of marriage. In particular, the analyses focus on divorce
174 JOURNAL OF FAMILY ISSUES / March 2005
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within the first 10 years of marriage. Because the central independent
variables are measured during the first 5 years of marriage, the analyses
pertain to divorce within the first 10 years of marriage for two reasons (for
a similar procedure, see Bumpass et al., 1991). First, it is unlikely that
spouses’ work characteristics, the amount of financial stress, and the
amount of marital interaction time stay the same during the course of mar-
riage. Second, the effects of work, financial stress, and marital interaction
time during the first years of marriage may change at longer durations
(Bumpass et al., 1991, p. 37).
Constraining the analyses to the first years of marriage has some disad-
vantages. First, because it is quite common for women to work early on in
the marriage, wives’ work might be less destabilizing then and the group
of nonworking women might be a selective group.1 A similar argument
holds for husbands. Because it is probably more common for husbands
not to work during the first years of marriage than later on, the effect of
husbands’ work during the first years of marriage might differ from work
effects at longer durations. Second, the conclusions are limited to the first
years of marriage. However, there are substantive reasons to assume that
financial and time pressures are particularly important during the first
years of marriage, as explained earlier.
The data come from the recently held large-scale survey Divorce in the
Netherlands 1998 (SIN98; Kalmijn, De Graaf, & Uunk, 2000). After
drawing a select sample of 19 municipalities, which are representative
with respect to region and urbanization, a stratified sample of respondents
from three subgroups was drawn: (a) persons in their first marriage, (b)
persons who divorced and did not remarry, and (c) persons who divorced
and remarried. As a result, divorced persons are overrepresented in the
sample. Because of its design, the sample does not include widowed per-
sons, cohabiting persons, or those who separated from a cohabiting union.
In face-to-face interviews, respondents provided retrospective informa-
tion about their marital and labor market history. Information about the
(former) spouse was obtained from the respondent. Information about the
spouse’s work history is therefore less detailed. More detailed informa-
tion about women’s labor market careers is needed because their career is
less continuous than that of men. Given the more detailed information
about respondents’careers, only female respondents are selected. In addi-
tion, I selected women who are either in their first marriage or divorced
from their first marriage. The resulting sample consists of 1,296 women,
of whom 1,024 eventually divorced. The women married between 1943
and 1997 and divorced between 1949 and 1998, with most divorces
occurring in the 1980s or 1990s (about 80%).
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MEASUREMENTS
The measures of spouses’ work characteristics, financial stress, and
marital interaction time pertain to the first 5 years of marriage. For respon-
dents who have not been married that long, the measures refer to the very
first years of marriage. Means and standard deviations for the central vari-
ables are displayed in Table 1.
Labor market characteristics of husband and wife. The measures can
be divided into (a) general work variables, which represent the financial
rewards from work and the time spent away from home; (b) financial as-
pects of work, which are particularly indicative of the pecuniary rewards;
and (c) time aspects of work, which are particularly indicative of the time
spent on the labor market. These measures are based on the average
amounts during the first 5 years of marriage because it is likely that the
measures for financial stress and marital interaction time indicate some
sort of average amount as well.
General Work Variables
Husband’s working hours. Respondents were asked about husbands’
work characteristics for two points in time: when they entered marriage
and for the 5th year after the start of marriage (or the 1st year when respon-
dents were not married that long). The information about his working
hours at these times is used to calculate the average number of hours
176 JOURNAL OF FAMILY ISSUES / March 2005
TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Spouses’ Labor Market
Characteristics, Financial Stress, and Marital Interaction Time
M (N = 1296) SD
Husband’s working hours 39.33 15.47
Wife’s working hours 20.68 17.67
Husband’s occupational income .19 .04
Wife’s occupational income .16 .03
Husband worked overtime .19 .39
Wife worked overtime .06 .24
Husband worked irregular hours .67 .85
Wife worked irregular hours .35 .70
Financial stress 1.15 1.53
Marital interaction time 1.34 .44
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worked per week. Husbands who did not work are given zero hours. Hus-
band’s working hours range from 0 (never worked) to 130 hours a week,
with an average of 39 hours. This average indicates that only few men did
not work at all (5%) or worked part of the time (15%). This variable is a
parsimonious representation of both employment stability and the num-
ber of working hours.2
Wife’s working hours. Respondents were retrospectively asked about
their entire work history. I calculated the average number of working
hours during the first 5 years of marriage. The wife’s working hours range
from 0 hours to 90 hours a week, with an average of 21 hours. About 30%
of the women did not work at all, whereas 41% worked continuously.
Financial Aspects
Husband’s occupational income. Using the scale by De Graaf and
Kalmijn (1995, 2001), I calculated the average monthly net income in
husband’s occupation(s), ranging from 945 to 3,153 Dutch guilders. I then
computed the average occupational income during the first years of mar-
riage (divided by 10,000). The scale distinguishes 74 occupations and
therefore conceals considerable income variability. However, because the
data do not contain retrospective information on income, it is the best
available alternative. It is the only Dutch scale focusing solely on financial
aspects, and the advantage of distinguishing relatively few occupations is
that it results in more reliable averages for income within an occupation.
This variable only pertains to husbands who worked. Husbands who never
worked are given the average.3
Wife’s occupational income. I calculated the average occupational in-
come during the first 5 years of marriage. Women who did not work at all
are given the average.
Time Aspects
Husband worked overtime. A dichotomous variable indicating
whether husbands worked 50 hours or more. I chose 50 hours as the cut-
ting point (10 hours or more beyond the regular 40-hour week) because
some overtime work is common and is therefore not necessarily an indica-
tion of excessive hours. About 19% of the men in the sample worked 50
hours or more.
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Wife worked overtime. A variable indicating whether the wife worked
more than 40 hours a week. The cutting point is at 40 hours because over-
time work is less common among the women in the sample; about 6%
worked more than 40 hours.
Husband’s irregular working hours. Respondents were asked how of-
ten their husband worked irregular hours (e.g., night shifts or weekends):
0 (never), 1 (sometimes), and 2 (often). I calculated the average of the
score at the start of marriage and the score at 5 years afterward. The result-
ing scale runs from 0 to 2. This scale only refers to husbands who worked.
Husbands who never worked are assigned a score of 0 (the most common
category).
Wife’s irregular working hours. Using the same procedure as for hus-
bands, I calculated the average score for how often wives worked at irreg-
ular hours during the first 5 years of marriage, running from 0 to 2. Wives
who did not work at all are assigned a score of 0.
Financial Stress
Respondents indicated whether they encountered the following finan-
cial problems in the first 5 years of marriage: (a) difficulty in making ends
meet; (b) not being able to quickly replace things that were broken; (c)
whether they had to borrow money for necessary expenditures; (d)
whether they were behind with payments for rent or mortgage or gas, wa-
ter, or electricity; (e) whether they had a visit from creditors or process
servers; and (f) whether they had received financial support from friends
or family. I constructed a scale counting the number of financial problems,
ranging from 0 to 6. Almost one half of the sample indicated that they en-
countered financial problems, and about 30% mentioned more than one
problem. These relatively high percentages probably reflect the high costs
of setting up a household at a time when spouses are only at the start of
their careers.
MARITAL INTERACTION TIME
Respondents indicated how often they participated with their spouse in
the following activities in the first 5 years of marriage: (a) visiting friends,
neighbors, or colleagues; (b) practicing sports, doing hobbies, or partici-
pating in community organizations; (c) going out to a bar, restaurant, cin-
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ema, or theater; (d) outdoor leisure activities such as biking; (e) going on
vacation; and (f) having dinner at home. Respondents could choose from
0 (often without the spouse), 1 (sometimes without the spouse), and 2
(never without the spouse). I constructed a scale by taking the average of
the scores on these items (also see Kalmijn & Bernasco, 2001). If respon-
dents did not participate in a certain activity, that activity was excluded
from the scale. The scale for marital interaction time runs from 0 to 2
(high).
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
The role of financial stress and marital interaction time is examined in
four steps: (1) assessing whether the general work variables and the job’s
financial and time aspects affect the risk of divorce, (2) examining the ex-
tent to which spouses’ work characteristics are associated with financial
stress and marital interaction time, (3) assessing whether financial stress
and marital interaction time influence the risk of divorce, and (4) testing
whether the link between spouses’ work and divorce is mediated by
financial stress and marital interaction time.
To examine the influence of spouses’ work, financial stress, and mari-
tal interaction time on divorce (Steps 1 and 3), discrete-time event history
analysis is used (Allison, 1984). The analyses are limited to divorce
within the first 10 years of marriage. Because about 50% of the 1,024
ever-divorced persons in the sample divorces after 10 years, this means
that I did not use all available information and artificially increased the
number of right-censored cases. However, discrete-time event history
handles the problem of right censoring (Allison, 1984). The dependent
variable is the probability of divorce in a particular year within the first 10
years of marriage, given that a person is still at risk. Divorce refers to the
moment the couple stopped living together. In practice, discrete-time
event history comes down to constructing a person-period file starting
with the year of marriage and ending with the year of divorce or the 10th
year after marriage (if the couple stays married), and applying logistic re-
gression. An advantage of this technique is that the overrepresentation of
ever-divorced persons in the sample does not affect the estimates of the
coefficients (Allison, 1999).
To examine the extent to which spouses’work characteristics are asso-
ciated with financial stress and marital interaction time (Step 2), I applied
ordinary least squares regression based on the person file. Although these
Poortman / HOW WORK AFFECTS DIVORCE 179
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on April 9, 2011jfi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
analyses are not directly comparable to event history models, the results
give an indication of the association between financial stress or marital
interaction time and spouses’ work.
The mediating role of financial stress and marital interaction time (Step
4) was examined by assessing whether the work effects disappear after fi-
nancial stress and marital interaction time are included in the event history
models for divorce. If the effects of the work variables (partly) disappear,
financial stress or marital interaction time (partly) explain the link be-
tween work and divorce. I also tested whether the coefficients change sig-
nificantly after controlling for financial stress and marital interaction
time.4
All models control for some basic demographic correlates of divorce.
The first two columns of Table 2 show what these control variables are,
how they are measured, and what their means and standard deviations are.
The last three columns of Table 2 show the effects of the control vari-
ables on the risk of divorce, on financial stress, and on marital interaction
time, respectively. The model for divorce shows that the risk of divorce in-
creases with marital duration and then decreases, suggesting that an in-
creasingly selective sample of happily married couples is left at longer du-
rations. As suggested by the general trend in divorce and the liberalization
of the divorce law in the 1970s, the risk of divorce increases during the pe-
riod studied. The presence of children, particularly younger ones, de-
creases the risk of divorce. The effects of age at marriage and parental di-
vorce are in the expected direction, but do not reach significance.
Consistent with the idea that traditional norms lower the risk of divorce,
the results show that religious persons, persons who married without co-
habiting, and persons from rural areas are less likely to divorce. Coming
from a Caribbean or Turkish or Moroccan background increases the risk
of divorce. A higher educational level of the wife and a lower educational
level of the husband increase the risk of divorce.
The model for financial stress shows that the presence of children in-
creases the number of financial problems, which is no surprise consider-
ing the costs of children. A parental divorce and cohabitation before mar-
riage also increase financial strains, just as coming from a Turkish or
Moroccan background. Couples marrying at an older age have fewer fi-
nancial problems, perhaps because they already have had more opportuni-
ties to save some money before marriage. Husband’s higher educational
level decreases financial stress, reflecting the greater earning capacity of
higher educated persons. Finally, the model for marital interaction time
shows that only a few variables are significant. Religiosity slightly in-
creases the amount of marital interaction time. If the couple cohabited be-
180 JOURNAL OF FAMILY ISSUES / March 2005
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on April 9, 2011jfi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
TA
BL
E 
2
M
ea
su
re
s 
a
n
d 
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
St
at
ist
ic
s o
f C
on
tr
o
l V
a
ri
ab
le
s
a
n
d 
R
es
ul
ts
 fo
r 
Ba
se
lin
e 
M
od
el
s o
f D
iv
o
rc
e,
 F
in
an
ci
al
 S
tr
es
s,
 a
n
d 
M
ar
ita
l I
nt
er
ac
tio
n 
Ti
m
e
M
od
el
 o
f
M
od
el
 o
f
M
od
el
 o
f
M
(S
D
)
D
iv
or
ce
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
tre
ss
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
Ti
m
e
M
ar
ita
l d
ur
at
io
n 
(dy
na
mi
c v
ar
ia
bl
e 
fo
r m
ar
ita
l d
ur
at
io
n 
in
 y
ea
rs
. 
Ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
in
 m
od
el
s f
or
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
tre
ss
 a
nd
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
tim
e)
.
00
a
(.0
0)
.
38
4*
D
ur
at
io
n 
sq
ua
re
d 
(a 
no
nli
ne
ar 
sp
ec
ific
at
io
n 
fit
s t
he
 d
at
a 
be
st)
.
00
a
(.0
0)
–
.
02
9*
Pe
rio
d 
(dy
na
mi
c v
ar
ia
bl
e 
fo
r c
al
en
da
r y
ea
r f
ro
m
 0
 [1
94
3]
 to
 55
 [1
99
8]
: a
 lin
ea
r
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n 
fit
s t
he
 d
at
a 
be
st.
 C
an
no
t b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 m
od
el
s f
or
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
tre
ss
an
d 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
tim
e)
30
.0
5a
(10
.97
)
.
05
8*
Pr
es
en
ce
 o
f c
hi
ld
re
n 
(vs
. n
o c
hil
dre
n) 
(dy
na
mi
c v
ar
ia
bl
e 
fo
r w
he
th
er
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
ch
ild
re
n
liv
in
g 
at
 h
om
e.
 In
 m
od
el
s f
or
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
tre
ss
 a
nd
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
tim
e,
 th
is 
va
ria
bl
e
in
di
ca
te
s w
he
th
er
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
du
rin
g 
fir
st 
5 
ye
ar
s o
f m
ar
ria
ge
)
.
13
a
(.3
4)
–
.
68
4*
.
50
7*
–
.
04
0
A
ge
 o
f t
he
 y
ou
ng
es
t c
hi
ld
 (d
yn
am
ic 
var
ia
bl
e.
 In
 m
od
el
s f
or
 fi
na
n
ci
al
 st
re
ss
 a
nd
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
tim
e 
th
is 
va
ria
bl
e 
in
di
ca
te
s t
he
 m
ax
im
um
 a
ge
 d
ur
in
g 
fir
st 
5 
ye
ar
s o
f
m
ar
ria
ge
. T
he
 av
er
ag
e 
is 
gi
v
en
 to
 c
hi
ld
le
ss
 c
ou
pl
es
)
.
51
b
(1.
81
)
.
17
6*
.
03
2
.
00
2
W
ife
 m
ar
rie
d 
be
fo
re
 a
ge
 2
1
.
24
b
(.4
3)
.
19
2
.
38
6*
–
.
01
2
R
el
ig
io
sit
y 
(co
un
t o
f w
he
the
r w
ife
 w
as
 c
hu
rc
h 
m
em
be
r a
t s
ta
rt 
m
ar
ria
ge
, w
he
th
er
sh
e 
at
te
nd
ed
 c
hu
rc
h 
of
te
n,
 w
he
th
er
 m
ot
he
r w
as
 c
hu
rc
h 
m
em
be
r, 
fro
m
 0
 to
 3
)
1.
48
(1.
04
)
–
.
20
9*
–
.
03
7
.
02
2+
(co
nti
nu
ed
)
181
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on April 9, 2011jfi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
W
ife
’
s 
pa
re
nt
s d
iv
o
rc
ed
 w
he
n 
w
ife
 w
as
 g
ro
w
in
g 
up
.
08
(.2
7)
.
17
2
.
35
2*
.
00
0
Co
ha
bi
te
d 
w
ith
 c
ur
re
nt
 o
r f
or
m
er
 p
ar
tn
er
 b
ef
or
e 
m
ar
ria
ge
.
34
(.4
8)
.
35
6*
.
18
8+
–
.
09
3*
Li
v
in
g 
in
 c
ity
 d
ur
in
g 
fir
st 
ye
ar
s o
f m
ar
ria
ge
.
69
(.4
6)
.
37
0*
.
07
5
.
02
1
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
of
 w
ife
 (d
yn
am
ic 
va
ria
bl
e 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
hi
gh
es
t l
ev
el
 o
f e
du
ca
tio
n,
 in
 y
ea
rs
,
6 
to
 1
6.
 In
 m
od
el
s f
or
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
tre
ss
 a
nd
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
tim
e,
 th
is 
va
ria
bl
e 
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e 
hi
gh
es
t l
ev
el
 in
 fi
rs
t 5
 y
ea
rs
 o
f m
ar
ria
ge
)
11
.3
6a
b
(2.
84
)
.
04
7*
–
.
01
9
–
.
01
1*
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
of
 h
us
ba
nd
 (h
igh
est
 ed
uc
ati
on
al 
lev
el
 in
 y
ea
rs
, f
ro
m
 6
 to
 1
6)
11
.4
7b
(3.
09
)
–
.
05
9*
–
.
07
7*
.
00
5
Tu
rk
ish
 o
r M
or
oc
ca
n 
et
hn
ic
ity
 (w
he
the
r w
ife
, w
ife
’
s 
fa
th
er
 o
r m
ot
he
r w
as
 b
or
n 
in
Tu
rk
ey
 o
r M
or
oc
co
)
.
01
(.1
1)
.
98
1*
1.
12
3*
–
.
15
5
Ca
rib
be
an
 e
th
ni
ci
ty
 (w
he
the
r w
ife
, w
ife
’
s 
fa
th
er
 o
r m
ot
he
r i
s b
or
n 
in
 S
ur
in
am
e 
or
N
et
he
rla
nd
s A
nt
ill
es
)
.
04
(.1
9)
.
42
6+
.
10
3
–
.
09
7
N
um
be
r o
f p
er
so
ns
1,
29
6
1,
29
6
1,
29
6
1,
29
6
N
um
be
r o
f p
er
so
n-
ye
ar
s
11
,6
90
N
um
be
r o
f e
v
en
ts
51
1
M
od
el
χ2
(df
)/R
2
44
3 
(14
)
.
10
0
.
02
3
a.
M
ea
ns
 a
nd
 st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
 o
f t
im
e-
va
ry
in
g 
va
ria
bl
es
 re
fe
r t
o 
th
e 
fir
st 
ye
ar
 o
f m
ar
ria
ge
.
b.
Fo
r 
co
u
pl
es
 w
ith
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
(in
 fir
st 
ye
ar
 o
f m
ar
ria
ge
).
+
p
<
 .1
0.
 *
p
<
 .0
5.
TA
BL
E 
2 
(co
nt
inu
ed
)
M
od
el
 o
f
M
od
el
 o
f
M
od
el
 o
f
M
(S
D
)
D
iv
or
ce
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
tre
ss
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
Ti
m
e
182
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on April 9, 2011jfi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
fore marriage, they spent less time in joint activities. Couples with a
higher educated wife also spend less time together. These findings suggest
that people with traditional or less individualistic values spend more time
together (Kalmijn & Bernasco, 2001).
RESULTS
THE INFLUENCE OF SPOUSES’ WORK ON DIVORCE
Table 3 presents the results for the influence of spouses’ work charac-
teristics on divorce. Model 1 includes the general work measures. As ex-
pected, the more hours the husband works, the less likely the couple is to
divorce. The results for the wife’s working hours are in line with expecta-
tions as well. Although the influence of her working hours is less strong
than that of the husband’s, the more hours the wife works, the higher the
probability of divorce.
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TABLE 3
The Relation Between Spouses’ Work and Divorce
(Discrete-Time Event History Analyses)
General Financial
Measures Aspects Time Aspects Both
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Husband’s working hours –.016* –.016* –.015* –.018* –.019*
Wife’s working hours .009* .009* .009* .010* .010*
Husband’s occupational income –.281 .343
Wife’s occupational income –2.676+ –3.013*
Husband worked overtime –.051 –.107 –.078
Wife worked overtime .036 .083 .061
Husband worked irregular hours .206* .210*
Wife worked irregular hours –.107 –.120+
Number of persons 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296
Number of person-years 11,690 11,690 11,690 11,690 11,690
Number of events 511 511 511 511 511
–2 log likelihood 3,723 3,719 3,723 3,710 3,705
Model χ2 (df) 475 (16) 479 (18) 475 (18) 489 (20) 493 (22)
NOTE: All the models include the control variables presented in Table 2.
+p < .10.  *p < .05.
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In Model 2, financial aspects of work are added to Model 1. If financial
strains matter, it is to be expected that low occupational income, particu-
larly that of the main provider (usually the husband), increases the risk of
divorce. However, there is no significant effect of husband’s occupational
income. The idea that husbands with lower income have more financial
stress, and hence a higher risk of divorce, is not supported. The effect of
the wife’s occupational income is negative and stronger than the effect of
the husband’s but is only marginally significant.
In Model 3, I included the variables indicating whether husband and
wife work overtime. Following the argument that time pressures increase
the risk of divorce, working overtime should increase the risk of divorce,
especially for women. The results do not support this line of reasoning.
For husbands, there is no additional destabilizing effect of working over-
time above and beyond the effect of their working hours. The findings
suggest that the more hours the husband works, the lower the risk of di-
vorce, even when he works substantially more than the regular number of
hours. The findings for wives do not suggest either that those who work
overtime are particularly more likely to divorce. Although the effect of
wives’ overtime work is less likely to become significant because of the
small number of women working overtime, women who work more than
40 hours are not more likely to divorce than those who do not work
overtime.
Model 4 includes spouses’ irregular working hours. Following the time
pressure argument, irregular working hours should increase the risk of di-
vorce, particularly the wife’s. The results show that there is an effect of
husband’s work irregularity that suggests that his work might be associ-
ated with time pressures. Husbands who work more often at irregular
hours are more likely to divorce. Contrary to expectations, the wife’s ir-
regular working hours do not increase the risk of divorce.
If financial aspects and time aspects are both included in Model 5, the
results are more or less the same. Husband’s working hours continue to
decrease the risk of divorce, whereas wives’ working hours increase the
risk. In addition, the destabilizing effect of the husband’s irregular work-
ing hours remains equally strong in Model 5, and the effects of husband’s
and wife’s overtime work continue to be insignificant. Contrary to previ-
ous models, Model 5 shows a negative effect of the wife’s occupational in-
come, which suggests that her income relieves financial strains. There is
also a negative, but marginally significant, effect of the wife’s irregular
working hours in this model. The influence of the wife’s income and the
husband’s irregular working hours may be indicative of the role of finan-
cial stress and marital interaction time, although these findings are con-
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trary to the common idea that time pressures are particularly associated
with wives’ work and financial strains with that of husbands. However, a
distinction between general, time, and financial aspects of work only pro-
vides indirect evidence, and whether financial stress and marital
interaction time actually account for the observed work effects remains to
be seen.
THE INFLUENCE OF SPOUSES’ WORK ON
FINANCIAL STRESS AND MARITAL INTERACTION TIME
Before turning to a direct test of the mediating role of financial stress
and marital interaction time in the next section, I examine whether
spouses’work characteristics are related to financial problems and marital
interaction time (see Table 4). If they are not, the mediating role of these
factors will probably be not that large.
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TABLE 4
The Relation Between Spouses’ Work and
Financial Stress or Marital Interaction Time
Financial Stress a Interaction Time b
General, General,
Time, and Time, and
General Financial General Financial
Measures Measures Measures Measures
Husband’s working hours –.020* –.027* –.002* .002
Wife’s working hours –.003 –.008* –.000 .001
Husband worked overtime .307* –.122*
Wife worked overtime .391* .045
Husband worked irregular hours .076 –.112*
Wife worked irregular hours .106+ –.064*
Husband’s occupational income –.991 .128
Wife’s occupational income –1.071 .364
Number of persons 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296
R2 .140 .154 .029 .100
Adjusted R2 .131 .141 .019 .087
NOTE: All the models include the control variables presented in Table 2, except for marital
duration and period.
a. Ordinary least squares regression of number of financial problems on the independent
variables on the basis of the person file.
b. Ordinary least squares regression of marital interaction time on the independent variables
on the basis of the person file.
+p < .10.  *p < .05.
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The first model of Table 4 shows the effects of the general work mea-
sures on financial stress. The husband’s working hours have a strong ef-
fect on the number of financial problems. The more hours he works, the
smaller the number of financial problems, which suggests that financial
stress might explain the stabilizing influence of the husband’s working
hours. The observed negative effect of wives’ working hours is smaller
and not significant. In the second model, I also included the job’s time and
financial aspects. Financial aspects, in particular, are expected to have an
influence. As before, the more hours the husband works, the smaller the
number of financial problems. The amount of financial stress also de-
creases when the wife works more hours, and the effect is significant now.
However, the effect of the husband’s working hours is much stronger than
that of the wife’s. It is surprising to note, time aspects of spouses’work do
affect financial stress, whereas financial aspects do not. Husbands’ and
wives’ overtime work are associated with more financial problems. To a
lesser extent, the wife’s irregular working hours are also associated with
more financial problems. These findings suggest that spouses increase
their work efforts by working overtime or irregular hours when there are
financial problems. It could also be that time-intensive jobs are in the
lower segments of the labor market. Although occupational income is
controlled for, these lower segment jobs might have less additional bene-
fits and are thus associated with more financial stress. The negative effects
of husband’s and wife’s occupational income are in the expected direction
but do not reach significance.
The results for marital interaction time are presented in the last two col-
umns of Table 4. The findings for the general measures show that the more
hours the husband works, the lower the amount of marital interaction
time. The wife’s working hours do not affect the amount of shared time,
and the mediating role of marital interaction time for her work is therefore
probably not large. If the time and financial aspects of work are also in-
cluded, the negative effect of husband’s working hours disappears after
controlling for whether he works overtime. If husbands work overtime,
marital interaction time is significantly lower than if they do not. Appar-
ently, only if husbands work excessive hours does the amount of marital
interaction time decrease. The wife’s working hours and overtime work
do not affect marital interaction time. With respect to spouses’ irregular
working hours, the results are in line with previous studies and show that
the more often spouses work at irregular hours, the smaller the amount of
marital interaction time. It is not surprising that husband’s and wife’s
income do not exert an influence on marital interaction time.
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THE INFLUENCE OF FINANCIAL STRESS AND
MARITAL INTERACTION TIME ON DIVORCE
AND THEIR ROLE AS MEDIATING FACTORS
In Table 5, I added financial problems and marital interaction time in a
stepwise manner to Model 1 and Model 5.5 The results show first whether
financial stress and marital interaction time have an effect on the risk of di-
vorce. Second, the findings show the mediating role of these factors.
Starting with the first question, the results for Model 1A show that cou-
ples facing more financial problems were significantly more likely to di-
vorce than those with fewer financial problems. It could be that this effect
is overestimated because of retrospective bias; divorced persons may have
a less positive view of the financial situation than still-married persons.
However, the odds of divorce are about 80% (e0.098×6) higher for couples
facing most financial problems than for couples with no financial prob-
lems. Given this strong effect, it is unlikely that retrospective bias is solely
responsible for the higher divorce risk in cases of financial stress. The re-
sults for Model 1B show that spouses who spend more time together have
a significantly lower risk of divorce than those spending less time to-
gether. When financial stress and marital interaction time are both in-
cluded, the effects become weaker due to a negative correlation between
the two factors (r = –.07). Contrary to financial stress, the effect of marital
interaction time is now marginally significant, which suggests that finan-
cial stress is a more important determinant of divorce. Models 5A through
5C also show that greater financial stress and, to a lesser extent, less mari-
tal interaction time increase the risk of divorce.
To answer the question on the mediating role of financial stress and
marital interaction time, I compared work effects across models to see
whether they are reduced when financial stress and marital interaction
time are controlled for. I also tested whether the coefficients for the work
characteristics differ significantly between the models. A comparison be-
tween Model 1 and Model 1A shows that the effect of husband’s working
hours becomes smaller in Model 1A and that the change is significant. Af-
ter taking into account that households in which the husband works more
hours also have fewer financial problems (see Table 4), the effect of the
husband’s working hours becomes smaller, although his working hours
continue to exert a significant influence on divorce in Model 1A. Addi-
tional analyses show that about 15% of the stabilizing effect of the hus-
band’s greater number of working hours is explained by the resulting
fewer financial problems.6 For the wife’s working hours, there are no
strong indications that her work reduces financial strains. After including
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financial stress, the effect of the wife’s working hours slightly increases,
suggesting that women’s work reduces some of the financial pressures.
However, the change in the coefficient is not significant, suggesting that
other interpretations of the effect of wife’s work on divorce are more
important.
A comparison of the effects of spouses’ working hours between Mod-
els 1 and 1B shows that the mediating role of marital interaction time is
negligible. Despite the main effect of marital interaction time, the effects
of husband’s and wife’s working hours do not change much when marital
interaction time is controlled for, and the changes are not significant. The
associations between spouses’working hours and marital interaction time
(see Table 4) are probably not strong enough to account for the relation-
ship between spouses’ work and divorce. When financial problems and
marital interaction time are both added to Model 1 (see Model 1C), the
results are more or less the same.
Next, I added the measures of financial stress and marital interaction
time to the most extensive model (Model 5). It might be that the effects of
financial aspects of the job are particularly mediated by financial stress
and that the effects of time aspects of the job are mediated by interaction
time. Comparing the coefficients for husband’s working hours between
Model 5 and Model 5A shows that the effect of the husband’s working
hours is partly explained by financial stress, and again by about 15%.
However, the effect continues to be significant after taking into account
that husbands’ work reduces financial stress. As before, the role of finan-
cial stress for the relation between the wife’s working hours and the risk of
divorce is smaller. The mediating role of financial stress for the financial
aspects of the job is not that large. Model 5 shows that wife’s occupational
income is the only financial aspect that significantly affects the risk of di-
vorce. If financial stress is added to the model, the effect of the wife’s oc-
cupational income becomes somewhat smaller, but the change is only
marginally significant. The smaller divorce risk of women with a higher
income can therefore not be attributed to a resulting decrease in financial
strains.
Model 5B adds marital interaction time to Model 5. As before, the me-
diating role of marital interaction time for the influence of spouses’work-
ing hours is negligible. The effects of time aspects of spouses’ jobs do not
seem to be mediated by marital interaction time either. The coefficient for
husband’s irregular hours becomes smaller after the amount of marital in-
teraction time is controlled for; however, the change in the coefficient is
insignificant. Although the results in Table 4 suggested that the higher di-
vorce risk of husbands who work irregular hours could have been due to a
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decrease in marital interaction time, the results do not support this. When
interaction time and financial problems are both added to Model 5 (Model
5C), the results are more or less similar, although some changes in the
effects become more significant.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
As in previous studies, the husband’s greater number of working hours
during the first years of marriage has been found to decrease the risk of di-
vorce, whereas the wife’s working hours increase the divorce risk. In the
current study, I addressed two interpretations for these effects of spouses’
work on divorce that have received relatively little attention in recent di-
vorce literature: the financial and time pressures associated with work. It
has been argued that part of the higher divorce risk of employed women
might be due to a decrease in marital interaction time, and that the higher
divorce risk in case of husbands’ unemployment or unstable employment
might be explained by the resulting financial strains. The findings offer
partial support for the financial stress interpretation and fail to support the
marital interaction time interpretation.
Financial stress was found to be partly responsible for the higher di-
vorce risk when husbands worked on average fewer hours during the first
years of marriage. Couples in which the husband works fewer hours not
only are at a higher risk of divorce but also have more financial problems,
which in turn substantially increase the risk of divorce. The greater finan-
cial strains when the husband works fewer hours were found to be partly
responsible for the increased risk of divorce in a direct test in which finan-
cial stress was included as a mediating factor. About 15% of the higher di-
vorce risk when the husband works fewer hours was explained by the re-
sulting financial problems. However, a relatively large portion remains
unexplained, and the husband’s fewer working hours continue to increase
the risk of divorce when the resulting financial strains are taken into ac-
count. The finding that the financial aspects of a husband’s job do not have
an influence on the risk of divorce also suggests that financial strains are
not solely responsible for the higher divorce risk when husbands are less
successful in the labor market.
The higher divorce risk of women who worked on average more hours
during the first years of marriage could not be explained by a decrease in
marital interaction time. Although spending less time together increases
the risk of divorce, women who work more hours do not spend less time
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with their spouses than those working fewer hours. The results of a direct
test for the mediating role of marital interaction time confirm that low
marital interaction time does not explain the destabilizing influence of the
wife’s working hours. The negligible role of time pressures was also ap-
parent from the nonsignificant influence of time aspects of the wife’s job
on the risk of divorce.
All in all, the results suggest that other interpretations for the link be-
tween spouses’ work lives and divorce are probably more important than
interpretations in terms of financial stress and marital interaction time.
However, it should first be noted that the findings only pertain to the first
years of marriage. Although it was argued that financial and time pres-
sures might be particularly important during this period, it is up to future
research to prove otherwise and examine whether the role of financial
stress and marital interaction time is stronger for longer durations. Sec-
ond, the results pertain to the Netherlands, which is characterized by a
rather extensive welfare system and a relatively strong focus on family
life. As argued, this institutional and social-cultural context may have re-
sulted in a relatively small mediating role of financial stress and marital in-
teraction time compared to other countries. Third, the nonexistent mediat-
ing role of marital interaction time does not necessarily imply that time
pressures are not important. Although the time constraints imposed by a
job do not seem to result in substantially lower marital interaction time,
they might lead to feelings of being overloaded or perceptions of unfair-
ness surrounding the division of domestic labor, which in turn increase the
risk of divorce (Crouter, Bumpus, Head, & McHale, 2001; Spitze &
South, 1985; Wilkie, Feree, & Ratcliff, 1998). Finally, the findings do not
provide answers to the question of which other explanations can account
for the link between spouses’ work and divorce. Future research should
address which other interpretations underlie the relation between spouses’
work lives and divorce.
NOTES
1. In further analyses I tried to control for this selectivity by controlling for premarital
birth, childbirth during marriage, illness at the start of marriage, and school enrollment; how-
ever the work effects for the wife did not change. The work effects do not alter for husbands
either if I included enrollment in school, which is a likely source of selectivity among
nonworking husbands, in the model.
2. I tried several specifications of husbands’work. I estimated the effects of employment
stability and number of hours worked (if they work) separately on divorce. The results show
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that both aspects significantly affect divorce: Husbands who never worked have a higher risk
of divorce, and husbands who work more hours run a smaller risk. This already suggests that
husbands’work efforts can also be represented by the more parsimonious variable indicating
their average working hours. A comparison of the fit of the models shows that a model with
husbands’working hours fits the data better than a model including employment stability and
the number of hours. In addition, a model including husband’s average working hours and ad-
ditional controls for whether he never worked or only worked part of the time shows that
these controls do not affect divorce and do not improve the fit of the model. Similar analyses
for the wife show that the effect of her average working hours on divorce might be underesti-
mated. Although the number of hours worked (if the wife works) increases the risk of di-
vorce, women who never worked are at a relatively high risk of divorce, especially compared
to those who only worked part of the time. However, a model that only includes the wife’s av-
erage working hours fits the data better. In addition, the positive effect of the wife’s average
working hours does not disappear after including additional controls for whether she never
worked or only worked part of the time, and such a model also fits the data less well.
3. Assigning average incomes for those who did not work implies that the effect of occu-
pational income only pertains to working persons, and this is exactly where my theoretical in-
terest lies. The methodologically most correct procedure would be to assign nonworking per-
sons a single score and include a dichotomous variable indicating whether persons worked.
Such a specification ensures that the income effect refers to working persons and that this ef-
fect remains the same regardless of what score is assigned to nonworking persons. Theoreti-
cally assigning the average score is the most obvious because nonworking persons are then
compared to working persons with an average income. Because a continuous specification of
working hours is a more informative measure and makes the results for the mediating role of
financial stress and interaction time easier to interpret, I included this continuous variable in-
stead of a dichotomous variable. However, the results do not substantially differ from the
results of models including a dichotomous variable.
4. To test whether the coefficients differ significantly, I applied seemingly unrelated esti-
mation, which allows for the testing of cross-model hypotheses (Weesie, 1999). The estima-
tion takes into account the clustering of years within persons.
5. I first tested whether there are any interaction effects between marital interaction time
or financial stress, on one hand, and the work characteristics of the spouses, on the other.
There were no significant interaction effects between spouses’ working hours and financial
stress or marital interaction time when interaction effects are added to Models 1A, 1B, or 1C.
When interaction effects are included in Models 5A, 5B, or 5C, there are no significant inter-
action effects between spouses’ work characteristics and financial stress or marital
interaction time either.
6. Because logistic regression coefficients (unlike regression coefficients) cannot be
compared directly across models, I calculated marginal effects of the husband’s working
hours on the probability of divorce. Contrary to the logistic coefficients, changes in the ef-
fects on the probabilities can be interpreted (Long, 1997). Specifically, I calculated the aver-
age marginal effect of the husband’s working hours under Models 1 and 1A. This means that I
computed the marginal effect for all persons (given their own values on the other independent
variables), followed by the average marginal effect over all persons. A comparison of the av-
erage marginal effect of the husband’s working hours under Models 1 and 1A shows what
percentage of the effect of the husband’s working hours is explained by financial stress.
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